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New Men in the Line

An Assessment of Reinforcements to the 48th
Highlanders in Italy, January-October 1944
Andrew Brown

“Alex told me that the hundred and forty soldiers following us had arrived in England from Canada only
a month earlier. Inadequately trained and unprepared for what awaited them, they had been prematurely
shipped to Italy to transfuse our wasted regiment. Marching behind us in their clean, new uniforms, they
joked with one another, stared curiously at the debris of war, and sang the brave and foolish songs they had
learned in Canada.”1
Farley Mowat, And No Birds Sang.

A

necdotal evidence, such as the
above quotation, suggests that
the Canadian Army rushed poorly
trained infantry reinforcements to
battle during the Second World
War. Widely accepted as fact, the
common perception of inadequate
reinforcement training can be
traced back to September 1944,
when Toronto sports entrepreneur
Conn Smythe issued a statement
to the press lambasting the poor
quality of Canadian reinforcements.
Smythe, who had been wounded the
previous July while commanding
an anti-aircraft battery in France,
claimed to have conferred during
his convalescence with other injured
officers from across the army who
agreed that reinforcements were
appallingly ill-prepared for combat.
He asserted that an unacceptable
proportion of men had never thrown
a grenade, were unfamiliar with
the Bren gun, or had never fired,
or sometimes even seen, a PIAT
(Projector Infantry Anti-Tank) gun.
His claim alarmed the public and
Cabinet, 2 and soon every major
Canadian newspaper reproduced
his story, fuelling the concern. 3

Abstract : Anecdotal evidence,
consis ting mainly of soldier s’
testimony and widely accepted as
fact, suggests that Canadian infantry
reinforcements in the Second World
War lacked training. However, a
sample of service records does not
support the contention that the
army sent masses of untrained men
to war. Indeed, the service files of
soldiers killed in Italy with the 48th
Highlanders of Canada between
January and October 1944 indicate
that the army rushed few men into
battle. Furthermore, the war diaries
of units that provided refresher
training to men in the reinforcement
stream indicate that the army strove
to ensure soldiers were ready for
combat.

Smythe’s allegations echoed the
apparently widespread sentiments
of officers fighting in Italy. According
to an army historical officer’s
report of 20 February 1944, “All
commanders in Italy agree that the
mental and physical qualities of
their reinforcements are high but
complain that their basic training is
frequently inadequate.”4 Later that
year, when the minister of national
defence, Colonel J. Layton Ralston,
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visited Canadian units in Italy, the
regimental sergeant major (RSM) of
the 48th Highlanders complained
that only seven out of 72 men in a
recent reinforcement draft were fully
trained.5
Despite such compelling
testimonies, it is not clear that the
army rushed masses of poorly trained
infantry reinforcements into combat.
When, for example, Ralston pressed
the RSM for the 72 names, his unit
could provide only 34. Ralston
ordered a review that eventually
determined that all 34 men had been
in the army for at least a year, a
quarter had over three years under
arms, and some were highly trained
specialists.6 More recently, historians
have questioned the accuracy and
consistency of the anecdotal evidence
suggesting that the degree to which
undertrained soldiers was a problem
remains a gap in the historical
record.7 Robert Engen’s examination
of battle experience questionnaires
completed by infantry officers during
the Second World War shows that
59.9 percent of respondents felt that
the general standard of reinforcement
efficiency was “moderate” and
35
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another 5.6 percent thought it was
“high,” compared to 26.8 percent
who answered “low.”8 While these
numbers were not quite a ringing
endorsement of reinforcement
quality, they hardly reflected
unanimous condemnation either.
Given the lack of clarity on the matter
of reinforcement training, it is useful
to examine archived army records
to understand better how the army
prepared infantry reinforcements
for combat. Evidence drawn from
a sample of personnel files from
a regiment that fought in Italy,
the 48th Highlanders of Canada,
as well as the war diaries of the
army’s reinforcement training units,
suggests that Canadian infantry
reinforcements were, for the most
part, reasonably well-trained when
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they joined their battalions. While
a relatively small proportion may
have been inadequately trained,
the body of anecdotal evidence
exaggerates the extent of the problem.
The personnel files consulted were
those for all members of the 48th
Highlanders who died during the
first ten months of 1944, a period
when the army was hard-pressed
to maintain unit strengths in Italy
due to unexpectedly high infantry
casualty rates. During this period, the
48th Highlanders, a justifiably proud
and hardened veteran unit of the 1st
Canadian Infantry Brigade in the 1st
Canadian Infantry Division, lost 143
men.9 Their service files, available
to the public without restriction,10
provide a sample with which to
assess how the army prepared its men

for combat duty. These files are useful
because they contain documents
indicating the exact dates each soldier
spent at every training, holding,
reinforcement, and operational unit
during his military service.11
Of the 143 men who died, 89 were
reinforcements who disembarked
i n t h ea t r e a f t er t h e Can a di an
army landed in mainland Italy on
3 September 1943. Most of these
reinforcements followed the same
training and deployment pattern
(see Figure 1).12 After basic recruit
and infantry training in Canada the
men were transported to Britain
where they were usually posted to
a Canadian Infantry Reinforcement
Unit (CIRU). 13 Once called up
for service in the Mediterranean
Theatre, soldiers then moved to the
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to joining the 48th Highlanders in the
field. However, the individual service
files contain little information about
what training the soldiers received in
the reinforcement units in Britain and
Italy, making it necessary to consult
the war diaries of those units.14
Infantrymen arriving in Britain
from basic training in Canada went
to one of seven CIRUs. 15 The war
diary for 1 CIRU for January to
October 1944 shows that new arrivals
were posted to training companies,
which in January 1944 conducted

“basic refresher courses” of two,
four and six weeks duration, and
one “advanced training” course.16 In
March 1944, all CIRUs implemented
a mandatory two-week refresher
course for all new arrivals. All
soldiers who completed the course
then had to pass weapons handling
tests, known as Tests of Elementary
Training (TOETs). Soldiers who
failed the tests received further basic
training, while the rest continued to
receive advanced refresher training
while awaiting call-up for service in

Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Centre ZK 246

1st Canadian Base Reinforcement
Depot (CBRD) (which, by January
1944, was located in Avellino, Italy)
where they trained while awaiting
call-up for service in a front line unit.
Reinforcements for the 48th
Highlanders during the first ten
months of 1944 were, in the majority
of cases, not as new to the army as
one might expect. While it is true
that some soldiers had less than
a year in uniform on the day they
reported to the unit, they were
exceptions. For the 89 reinforcements
reviewed, the average time a soldier
had been in the army at the moment
he joined the 48th Highlanders in the
field was almost 26 months. If one
examines only the privates, that is the
group with the men most recently in
uniform, the average time in service
does not drop much. Sixty-seven of
the 89 soldiers were privates, and as
a group they averaged slightly over
23 months in the army. Only 17 had
less than a year in uniform when they
were “taken on strength” by the 48th
Highlanders.
The amount of time spent at a
CIRU in Britain and at the CBRD
in Italy varied greatly from soldier
to soldier. Some men spent only a
few weeks in the UK, while others
spent well over two years there. The
average time each soldier spent in
Britain was just over ten months, a
considerable amount of time during
which a man was available for
training. Similarly, the time each
individual spent at the CBRD in Italy
varied greatly, with some soldiers
having spent as little as one or two
weeks, while others were there for
many months. The average time
spent at the CBRD was just over sixand-one-half weeks, suggesting that
the typical soldier had time to receive
a reasonable amount of in-theatre
refresher training immediately prior

Basic training at Landsdowne Park,
Ottawa, Ontario.
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3-inch mortar and 6-pounder antitank gun courses that lasted three and
four weeks respectively.21
From early June to early
September 1944, however,
reinforcements passed through the
CIRUs too quickly to receive the
full range of continuation training.
During this period, the army was
under enormous pressure to sustain
a steady stream of reinforcements
to its infantry units, minimizing
the time soldiers could remain
Canadian soldiers train in England.
Left: Crossing a rope line high over a
group of watching officers, June 1943.

Europe.17 Refresher training included
exercises on anti-tank ranges, zeroing
rifles, firing Sten and Thompson submachine guns, throwing grenades, a
special one-week mines and booby
traps course, battlefield first aid,
preparation of defensive positions,
individual field craft, and night
patrols.18 By April 1944, 1 CIRU held
company commanders personally
responsible for providing all their
troops, including their permanent
establishment personnel who could
be deployed to operational units,
with as much training as possible.
The company commanders were
also responsible to retest all troops’
individual skills every three months.19
After completing the mandatory
two-week refresher course, soldiers at
1 CIRU continued training until they
were called forward to an operational
theatre. D Company was responsible
for providing this ongoing program,
which sometimes included lowlevel collective, or group, training,
such as section stalks, night patrols,
and minefield drills. The aim was
to exercise soldiers continually and
keep their skills sharp. 20 As time
allowed, 1 CIRU also provided some
men with specialist training, such as
38
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Below: Two soldiers climb over a log wall
obstacle, November 1941.
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in Britain. Early that summer, on
orders from Headquarters Canadian
Reinforcement Units (CRU), all
CIRUs reduced the two-week
refresher course to one week. 22
The week-long syllabus included
mostly weapons training and range
practices. Furthermore, owing to
a lack of time, 1 CIRU conducted
TOETs for only two of eight drafts
sent forward during this period,
making it difficult for the unit to
attest to the combat readiness of
each reinforcement. During this
“rush” period, 1 CIRU’s commander,
Colonel C.B. Ware, assessed that most
of these men required additional
refresher training. Still, 1 CIRU did
what it could to make the best use of
the available time. For example, the
unit held classes during the weekends
and evenings, and it provided
additional training on mines and
booby traps to soldiers who required
it. Although the soldiers’ training was
not complete, according to Colonel
Ware “no man was despatched who
had not received instruction in all
platoon weapons and had fired each
weapon.”23
By mid-September, the situation
stabilized, and CIRUs received
orders to reinstitute the two-week
syllabus.24 This allowed 1 CIRU to
revert to its previous practice of
delivering the mandatory two-week
course, re-training soldiers whose
performance during the two weeks
was insufficient, and providing
ongoing training to soldiers who
passed the standard course while
they awaited call-up.25
There is evidence that 1 CIRU
periodically took measures to
improve training. For example,
on at least one occasion the unit
managed to take into its ranks as
permanent staff a group of officers
and non-commissioned officers
(NCOs) with recent experience
in Italy. 26 Furthermore, the unit
carefully assessed the level of training
soldiers received in Canada prior
to arriving at 1 CIRU, with the
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015

training companies actively seeking
to identify and rectify major training
deficiencies.27 By October 1944 1 CIRU
refined the process by making the
companies responsible for providing
the unit chief instructor with detailed
assessments on inadequately trained
individuals. Each of these assessments,
consolidated by the chief instructor in
“State of Training – Reinforcements”
reports, included an affected soldier’s
name, course number and dates of his
training in Canada, and statements
of deficiency. 28 On 1 September,
a group of senior officers from
HQ CRU and a liaison officer from
Canada conducted a visit to 1 CIRU,
during which the unit chief instructor
provided “general criticisms and
suggestions” regarding the training
of soldiers in Canada.29
In short, infantry soldiers passing
through Britain on their way to
Italy received carefully planned
continuation training at one of the
army’s reinforcement units. Generally
speaking, the longer a soldier stayed
in Britain, the more training he
received. Even during the “rush
period” of June-September 1944,
soldiers received at least a week’s
training to refresh their ability to use
standard platoon weapons. Outside
the rush period, soldiers received
more training – of at least two weeks
to cover the essentials – and often a
great deal more for those who spent
months at a reinforcement unit.
After departing a CIRU in
Britain for Italy, all soldiers passed
through the Mediterranean theatre’s
reinforcement depot, 1 CBRD, where
they received yet more training before
finally joining their units.30 Although
the army originally intended that
1 CBRD only hold reinforcements
waiting to be called to their units,
by 1944, the depot provided new
arrivals with refresher training to
make up for any deficiencies.31 On 22
January, the commandant of 1 CBRD,
Colonel G. Hedley Bashar, issued
an order that held the depot’s three
battalion commanders responsible

for ensuring that, “the physical
conditions of personnel and their
level of training is such that they
will be suitable reinforcements.”
The battalion commanders were
to sign attestations indicating that
each soldier deploying forward was
medically and administratively fit and
that their equipment was “complete
and in satisfactory condition.” 32
In February, the commander of 1
Canadian Base Reinforcement Group
(1 CBRD’s superior headquarters),
Brigadier E.W. Haldenby, issued a
training instruction that reinforced
the fundamental importance of
preparing men for combat, stating
“our main consideration is testing
and completing the basic training of
rank and file.”33
When new drafts arrived at
1 CBRD from Britain, the unit assessed
each soldier to identify any training
deficiencies. Standardized written
assessments of incoming drafts after
January 1944 included the following
headings: numbers arriving, state of
training, condition of clothing and
equipment, documents, physical
standard, source from which draft
was drawn, and general comments
on military efficiency.34 Completed
reports attached to 1 CBRD’s war
diary indicate that while newly
arrived drafts during the first ten
months of 1944 generally needed
some improvement, there were not
the sort of serious shortcomings and
gaps that would merit the description
“untrained.” For example, on 7
March 1 CBRD assessed a new draft
of 320 soldiers who were destined for
service with the 48th Highlanders.
The physical condition of these
troops appeared “to be quite good”
and their knowledge of fieldcraft
and camouflage was “fair.” Most,
however, had no experience with
the PIAT or the Thompson submachine gun (TMSG).35 (It is worth
noting that soldiers arriving in Italy
probably lacked training on the
Thompson because the army had
long since replaced it with the Sten
39
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gun in all theatres except Italy, where
it remained in service.) The troops
“had some” mine warfare training,
but were not sufficiently trained in
field engineering and small-arms
range work. Nonetheless, after being
given TOETs on eight basic subjects,
49 passed all tests, 248 failed one or
two tests – not surprising, given most
men required Thompson and PIAT
training – and only 23 failed more
than two tests.36
Other reports on reinforcements
arriving in Italy paint a similar
picture of some good skills overall,
but a need for additional continuation
training to prepare them for frontline
service. A consolidated assessment
of March 1944 on 11 newly arrived

drafts (who came from six different
CIRUs) reported that:
approximately 50% of the ORs are
well grounded in basic subjects
other than TMSG, PIAT & 2” mortar
in which training was not complete
though all had some knowledge of
these weapons. They were taught
Sten in UK instead of TMSG.
Remainder require more handling
in most basic and advanced subjects.

The group was “in need of a
few more weeks training.”37 In early
April, an assessment of newly-arrived
troops indicated that while discipline
and morale were good, their training
was “not entirely satisfactory” due

to insufficient time spent in Britain.38
Similarly, a late May assessment
noted that the soldiers in a recently
arrived draft were generally welltrained (that is, most troops passed
most of the TOETs) but required
additional training on some weapons
such as the Thompson and PIAT.39
All these new arrivals were to receive
training at 1 CBRD to rectify these
deficiencies and prepare each man
for service in the line.
At 1 CBRD there was refresher
training for individual skills, as well
as physical conditioning and some
collective training. Each week from
Monday to Saturday training took
place from 0800 hours to at least
1630 hours and included, among

An MFM 4 Service and Casualty Form for a soldier who joined the 48th Highlanders as a reinforcement in June 1944. This soldier
arrived in England with the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and spent nine months at various Canadian Infantry Reinforcement
Units before being sent to Italy.
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other subjects, weapons lectures
and practice on ranges, physical
fitness, mine warfare lectures, tenmile route marches, and individual
and section fieldcraft training. Night
training included marches and
patrol practices.40 In April, 1 CBRD
increased the pace of training so
that within three weeks all available
reinforcements would be fully
trained and ready to join their units.
Brigadier Haldenby also ordered
all 1 CBRD battalion commanders
to hold an eight-day field exercise
without delay. He directed that units
maintain “a high standard of patrol
and fieldcraft training” and that
they make every soldier capable of
marching ten miles within two hours
for “hardening” purposes. Night
training was to occur at least two
nights per week.41
Training regimes tailored to
the requirements of specific groups
were also provided by 1 CBRD. In
February 1944, for example, a group
of reinforcements for the Royal
22nd Regiment proved to have
an “excellent” level of weapons
training, but needed more practice
in fieldcraft, battle drill and night
operations. A custom two-week
program saw the troops improve
rapidly. 42 Officers also received
special attention. In mid-February
1944, 1 CBRD implemented a plan
to optimize officer readiness to
lead men in battle. The unit kept
reinforcement officers fully involved
in the troops’ training regimes.
These officers were responsible for
teaching basic subjects, planning and
executing exercises, and rehearsing
men in the conduct of reconnaissance
and fighting patrols. In addition,
once a week, officers attended clothmodel exercises at night, participated
in radio handling exercises, and
wrote papers on general military
subjects.43 Other programs at 1 CBRD
included one and two-week specialist
courses that qualified individuals
as mortarmen, machine gunners,
signallers, and stretcher bearers.
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015

Some soldiers also received
advanced instruction on
mines.44
To ensure training
was relevant, 1 CBRD
periodically sought
feedback from line units
on reinforcement quality.
In late February 1944, a
1 CBRD delegation visited
various line units where,
interestingly, there was
little serious criticism
regarding basic skills. The
commanding officer of the
Royal Canadian Regiment
(RCR) advised that some
troops needed more
training in night fighting,
night patrols, and “taking
over positions.” Brigadier
Dan Spry, commander
Major Paul Triquet joined 1 Canadian Base Reinforcement
Depot as the second-in-command of 1st Battalion. As a
of 1st Canadian Infantry
recent Victoria Cross recipient his battle experience would
Brigade, opined that units
have been useful in preparing new troops for combat.
needed more men with
specialist qualifications,
such as snipers, mine and booby-trap
The army also sought to ensure
handlers, and demolition experts,
training at 1 CBRD met front-line
though he also noted that “some
needs by posting veterans into the
personnel have arrived unfamiliar
depot as instructors. In January
with the use of grenades and tommy
1944 the 48th Highlanders alone
guns.” Brigadier T. Eric Snow,
sent seven NCOs to 1 CBRD on
commander of 11th Canadian Infantry
an exchange program. 47 Later,
Brigade, advised that some personnel
in June 1944, the army planned
in a recent draft had not passed all
to exchange officers and NCOs
TOETs. 45 During another visit to
between operational field units and
1 CBRD’s permanent staff. The aim
units in late March, front line officers
was to furnish reinforcements with
were more critical of reinforcement
relevant, high-quality training, while
training, advising 1 CBRD that new
providing less stressful employment
soldiers lacked expertise on the PIAT,
to soldiers who had served in the
the Thompson SMG, mortars, and the
line for prolonged periods. At the
Vickers machine gun. (While not to
same time, the scheme would allow
be dismissive of these complaints, the
instructors from the reinforcement
Vickers and two of three mortar types
depots to gain valuable combat
in service – the 3-inch and the 4.2-inch
experience.48 On 21 September, the
– required specialist training). Too
many reinforcement soldiers also had
Royal 22nd Regiment’s Major Paul
poor weapons maintenance habits.46
Triquet, a national hero who was
awarded the Victoria Cross the
These commentaries underscore
previous December for his heroism
two points: that 1 CBRD actively
and leadership in battle, joined
sought feedback from units on how
1 CBRD as the 1st Battalion’s secondto improve training, and, while
in-command. 49 On 7 October, the
units reported some problems, the
deficiencies were not grave.
48th Highlanders sent another two
41
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Infantrymen of the 48th Highlanders of
Canada advancing on Point 146 during
the advance on the Gothic Line near the
Foglia River, Italy, 28-29 August 1944.

NCOs to 1 CBRD to assist in the
training of personnel remustered to
infantry.50 Other operational units
almost certainly did likewise.
For a brief period, 1 CBRD
even sent formed groups forward
to operational units to receive
training. In mid-June 1944, MajorGeneral Chris Vokes, commander
of 1st Canadian Infantry Division,
authorized 1 CBRD to attach to each
of the division’s infantry battalions a
100-man company of reinforcements
for two weeks of training.51 On 18
June, the companies left 1 CBRD
to join the field units of all three
brigades.52 That evening, the 48th
Highlanders greeted their company
and prepared to execute the training
scheme. At this time, the unit (indeed,
the entire Canadian Corps) was in
reserve, and therefore presumably
had the capacity to train its future
reinforcements. Some of the officers
in this company of trainees – which
the 48th Highlanders embraced by
naming E Company – remained
with the unit until mid-July before
returning to 1 CBRD.53
During September and October
1944, however, 1 CBRD was hardpressed to furnish units with enough
reinforcements, and this may have
affected the quality of training.
Indeed, by September 1944, high
casualty rates and the attendant
demand for new troops had all but
depleted the infantry reinforcement
42
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pool in Italy. Throughout the
month, 1 CBRD barely kept up
with demands. 54 On 4 September,
1 CBRD received authority to deploy
tradesmen and non-trade specialists,
such as cooks and drivers, for
General Duty (ie. infantry) service,
if required for emergencies.55 The
war diary contains no indication
that the depot ultimately took such
desperate measures, nor does it
indicate whether or not the unit sent
drafts forward before training was
completed. 1 CBRD fully expected,
however, that specialist courses
would be cancelled in order to free
men for immediate combat service.56
Furthermore, on 18 September,
1 CBRD’s commander, Colonel
J.H. Christie, advised his battalion
commanders that “the situation in
the forward area is such that it is
vitally important to send forward
every available officer and man.” He
ordered 1 CBRD to recall all men on
leave, review all cases of personnel
declared “unavailable,” complete
all outstanding dental work, and
resolve all disciplinary cases without
delay.57 The pressure to produce as
many infantry reinforcements as
possible continued until at least the
end of October, when the Canadian
Corps was finally taken out of the
line and the pressing requirement
for reinforcements eased. 58 If ever
there was a period when 1 CBRD was
hard-pressed to provide adequate

training due to a lack of time, it was
in September and October 1944.
There is one group of men who
do not appear to have received
adequate training at 1 CBRD during
this period – men transferred to
infantry from other corps. In late
August 1944, the army implemented
a concerted remustering program
to help meet the growing need for
infantry reinforcements. 59 While
most basic infantry training for
remustered soldiers occurred in
Britain, 1 CBRD trained those soldiers
who transferred to the infantry corps
while already serving in Italy. 60
Furthermore, in early October the
army sent a group of 496 members of
the Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps
(RCOC) and the Royal Canadian
Electrical and Mechanical Engineers
(RCEME) from Britain to Italy for
conversion training.61 The training
provided to this group was not
extensive. Unfortunately, 1 CBRD
learned only at the last minute that
it was responsible for training these
troops; on 6 October, just two days
before the soldiers arrived, 1 CBRD’s
chief instructor alerted the unit that
the training of these men “appears to
be the responsibility of 1 C.B.R.D.”
He issued a rudimentary training
plan, consisting of only three weeks’
instruction on elementary skills and
procedures. 62 Even this program
was difficult to implement owing
to a shortage of instructors.63 Thus,
soldiers remustered to infantry and
trained in Italy in October may have
been inadequately trained.
It is not clear from the 48th
Highlanders’ war diary to what
extent, if any, the remustered soldiers
were a burden on the unit. The
entry for 11 September laments the
arrival of a draft of four officers,
none with combat experience, and
8
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90 men, most of whom – aside from
those returning from convalescence
– were remustered to infantry.
Nevertheless, a surprising number
of reinforcements arriving at the 48th
Highlanders between the middle
of August and the end of October
had previous service in the unit.
The regiment’s war diary notes that
most of the men in a reinforcement
draft of one officer and 48 men who
arrived on 13 August “had been
with the Battalion before.” 64 On 9
September the regiment received a
draft of one officer and 53 men. The
officer was one of the E Company
trainees attached to the battalion
during the early summer, while
about half of the men “had served
with the battalion before but had
been evacuated through wounds
or sickness.” 65 On 28 September,
the unit welcomed back ten of its
soldiers who had been hospitalized
then temporarily posted to other
units.66 On 5 October, one major and
24 non-commissioned reinforcements
arrived, “all of them Highlanders
of long standing.”67 Finally, on 27
October, 43 reinforcements arrived,
“all but six of whom were previously
with the Battalion.” Two were new
officers who had served previously
in the unit as NCOs.68 It is therefore
possible that the high number of
experienced reinforcements balanced
the challenges of absorbing poorlytrained remusters.
Certainly the 48th Highlanders’
war diary for the period January to
October 1944 says very little about
the overall quality of reinforcements,
and the few instances in which
reinforcement training is mentioned
do not highlight poor readiness. The
war diary for March 1944 contains
instructions from 1st Canadian
Infantry Brigade that detail the
brigade commander’s expectations
for processing newly arriving
reinforcements. Units were to hold
new troops in rear areas for up to
four days, but not less than 24 hours,
during which staffs were to review
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015

assessment of incoming drafts,
each soldier’s documents, verify his
soldiers still generally needed a bit
personal equipment as complete, and
more training after the two-week
issue his unit badges and flashes.
course, a minimum standard will be
Units were to give each soldier
taken as including at least two more
“smartening up drill,” consisting of
weeks training at 1 CBRD. Additional
“general tactical hints” and weapons
time at each location needs to be
handling tests. Finally, units were
allowed for arrival and departure
to place particular emphasis on
procedures, say one week before
educating the new soldiers on
and after training at each location.
“unit history and customs.”69 Such
This gives a total of eight weeks for
instructions hardly seem to reflect
a soldier to pass through a CIRU and
significant concern at the brigade
1 CBRD and be considered trained
level for the reinforcements’ state of
to minimally acceptable standards.
training. Similarly, a war diary entry
Taking this benchmark, the following
for 10 September notes that the RSM
categories have been established:
was busy “making life supremely
miserable” for a draft of newly
a. Soldiers with less than eight
arrived reinforcements, indicating
weeks total in the UK and at
that “from morning to night under
1 CBRD are assessed as probably
RSM CROSSLEY’s critical eye they
not well-trained;
march, salute and do arms drill and
b. Soldiers who spent eight to 12
tests of elementary training in small
weeks total in the UK and at
arms.” 70 While such treatment of
1 CBRD were probably trained
new arrivals was no doubt necessary
to the minimal acceptable
to establish the unit’s standard of
standard. Still, in order to err on
discipline, the emphasis on marching
the side of caution, these soldiers
and saluting is not what one would
are assessed here as having a
expect if the unit was concerned with
questionable level of training;
preparing undertrained troops for
c. Soldiers who spent between 12
combat.
and 20 weeks in the UK and at
The training at the CIRUs and at
1 CBRD – that is, having received
1 CBRD may not have been perfect,
between three and five months of
particularly for those men rushed
refresher training – are assessed
through those units. But, as we have
as probably well-trained; and
seen, many of the 48th Highlanders’
d. Soldiers who spent over 20
reinforcements spent a considerable
weeks, or five months, in the UK
amount of time at either or both
and at 1 CBRD are assumed to be
locations. Still, to arrive at informed
well-trained.
generalizations about the level of
training for soldiers reinforcing the
Figure 2 captures the results of 89
48th Highlanders, a few benchmarks
reinforcements assessed according
need to be established before
to these criteria.
interpreting the data contained
in the personnel files.
Figure 2: Training State of Reinforcements
For the purposes of this
study, a soldier will be
Well-trained
39 (44%)
considered trained to
Over 20 weeks in UK or at CBRD
the minimal acceptable
Probably well-trained
24 (27%)
12-20 weeks in UK or at CBRD
standard if he completed
– at the very least – the
Questionable
15 (17%)
8-12 weeks in UK or at CBRD
mandatory two-week
Probably not well-trained
course provided by
11 (12%)
Less than 8 weeks in UK or at CBRD
the CIRUs. Because,
Total
89 (100%)
as shown by 1 CBRD
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Library and Archives Canada PA 189919

Private Stanley Rodgers of the 48th
Highlanders of Canada, who holds a
PIAT anti-tank weapon, resting north of
the Conca River en route to Rimini, Italy,
September 1944.

This analysis is subjective.
Amongst other factors, certain
personnel may have experienced
extenuating circumstances that
resulted in reduced time for training.
A soldier posted to a CIRU or 1 CBRD
may have spent part of his time
there in detention, or in hospital, or
a combination of both, though such
circumstances have been accounted
for where possible. Similarly, because
the personnel files rarely indicate
how each soldier spent his time at
each unit, some men were likely
occupied with duties other than
training for possibly considerable
lengths of time. Therefore, it is not
claimed here that the results in Figure
44
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol21/iss3/4

2 represent precisely how well trained
reinforcements were when they
arrived at the 48th Highlanders. The
results are strong enough, however,
to suggest a trend. That is, most
reinforcements (roughly 70 percent)
were well-trained, based on the fact
that they spent a minimum of three
months training in the reinforcement
system. With somewhat greater
confidence, one can conclude that a
relatively small proportion of soldiers
(slightly over 10 percent) were
probably not well-trained when taken
on strength by the 48th Highlanders,
because they passed through the
reinforcement system too quickly.

Another group, numbering just
under 20 percent, had a questionable
level of training. Interestingly, these
numbers correspond closely with the
opinions expressed by the infantry
officers reported in Robert Engen’s
study.
Finally, it is worth noting that
information in the personnel files
reviewed for this study reinforce
an important, but perhaps underappreciated, and objectionable, aspect
of the army’s manpower management
during the Second World War: the
fact that the army heavily pressured
conscripts raised under the National
Resources Mobilization Act (NRMA)
to volunteer for service overseas.
As Daniel Byers explains in his
article “Mobilising Canada: The
National Resources Mobilization
Act, the Department of National
Defence, and Compulsory Military
Service in Canada, 1940-1945,” while
the government obliged NRMA
conscripts, or “Zombies,” to serve
only in defence of the homeland, the
army soon realized that pressuring
conscripts to “go active” was an
effective way to increase the number
of men for overseas service. Army
training centres deliberately mixed
conscripts and volunteers in the same
training platoons, encouraged the
volunteers to pressure the conscripts,
and implemented a wide array of
other measures designed to pressure
the NRMA men to volunteer for
active service. The efforts were often
brutal and coercive, and sometimes
included the threatened or actual use
of violence. They were also effective,
with some training units achieving
100 percent volunteer rates.71 Fully
a quarter of the reinforcements to
the 48th Highlanders in the sample
considered for this paper (22 of 89)
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: New Men in the Line An Assessment of Reinforcements to the 48th Highlanders in Italy, January-October 1944

were either conscripted under the
NRMA then went active, or chose to
volunteer for General Service when
it was clear that they were about to
be conscripted (for example, after
having received call-up notices).
Farley Mowat’s quote at the
beginning of this paper refers to
a draft that arrived at his unit,
the Hastings and Prince Edward
Regiment, on 24 December 1943.
The other two infantry regiments in
the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade,
the 48th Highlanders and the Royal
Canadian Regiment, also received
drafts the same day. 72 In fact, 14
of the 89 reinforcements reviewed
for this paper were part of the 24
December draft reinforcing the 48th
Highlanders. But whereas Mowat
learned that the soldiers arriving at
his unit had apparently “arrived in
England from Canada only a month
earlier,” the soldiers arriving at the
48th - at least the 14 whose records
were examined here - spent on
average over 15 months in England.
And, to a man, they also spent about
six weeks at 1 CBRD before joining
the 48th Highlanders in the line. The
same is probably true for the troops
Mowat greeted.73
By and large the reinforcements
arriving at the 48th Highlanders
during the first ten months of 1944
spent enough time training in Britain
and Italy to be reasonably wellprepared for combat. This contradicts
the mass of anecdotal information
which maintains that the army rushed
reinforcements into battle before they
were ready. Nonetheless, additional
research regarding reinforcement
training is required to confirm or
refine the results presented here.
The examination of a larger sample
of data, such as for all three infantry
units in the 1st Canadian Infantry
Brigade, would be valuable. Further
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015
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A Canadian soldier fires a PIAT anti-tank
weapon at a training school west of
Ortona, Italy, 10 January 1944.

scrutiny of the training provided to
remustered soldiers would be equally
important. Nonetheless, it is difficult
to accept that soldiers who generally
spent a fair amount of time training
in the reinforcement system arrived
at their units utterly incapable of
basic tasks.
Explaining the anecdotal
evidence of the reinforcements’
allegedly poor readiness is difficult.
Some complaints were probably wellfounded. Ten percent of the soldiers
examined here did not spend enough
time in the reinforcement system to
receive adequate refresher training.
Some observers of these personnel
may have painted all reinforcements
with the same brush. For brief periods
of time, the CIRUs and 1 CBRD (from
early June to early September 1944,
and September to October 1944
respectively) were challenged to
keep the stream of reinforcements
flowing, and soldiers passing
through those units during those
periods likely received abbreviated
training regimes. Furthermore, there
may be some truth to the notion,
as suggested by the army’s official

historian, C.P. Stacey, that “no
commanding officer ever admits that
the reinforcements his unit receives
have been properly trained.”74 By
1944 the Canadian infantry battalions
in Italy were hardened and veteran
units, fighting a determined and
resourceful enemy in difficult terrain
and weather conditions that favoured
the defenders. Units such as the
48th Highlanders had through grim
experience developed techniques
tailored to these difficult conditions. It
would be surprising if reinforcements
did not lack the specialized skills
resident in these veteran outfits.
In addition, other critics may have
complained of poor reinforcement
quality in an effort to convince the
government to send NRMA soldiers
overseas to support the fighting units.
Conn Smythe, for one, concluded his
famous public criticism of the quality
of reinforcements by calling for
taxpayers to insist that the government
support the fighting units by ordering
the NRMA men overseas.75 Perhaps
others were tempted to decry poor
reinforcement training to mask
other problems that resulted in poor
45
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battlefield performance, such as weak
leadership at low levels. Finally, C.P.
Stacey relates that some infantry
officers suggested that soldiers may
“have deliberately understated their
training in the hope of getting safer
assignments,” though he offers no
further detail.76
The mass of anecdotal information
claiming that infantry reinforcements
during the Second World War were
poorly-trained is at odds with army
personnel records and reinforcement
unit files. Similarly, the 48th
Highlanders’ war diary for the first
ten difficult months of 1944 contains
no disparaging comments regarding
the quality of its reinforcements.
Few of the men reinforcing the 48th
Highlanders during those months
were rushed into battle. Most,
though not all, spent too long in
the reinforcement stream’s training
units to be considered untrained. A
proportion – the actual size is difficult
to assess, but a bold estimate would
be as high as 30 percent – probably
needed more refresher training, but
these troops were the exception, not
the rule. More research is required
to clarify the factors that led to
the perceptions and accusations of
poorly-trained reinforcements. The
military records reviewed for this
paper certainly confirm the army’s
difficulty in generating enough
infantry reinforcements during
the summer and early fall of 1944.
Some soldiers probably required
additional refresher training, but in
all likelihood the problem was not
nearly as pronounced or widespread
as the mass of anecdotal evidence
suggests.
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